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Abstract 
 
More than thirty-eight million Americans had no health insurance in 2000 
according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Of the uninsured, approximately 60% worked at 
firms that did not offer insurance, 20% were not eligible for offered employer insurance, 
and 20% did not take up the health insurance offered by the employer. We focus here on 
the decision to enroll in offered employer health insurance asking the question, “How 
much does the out-of-pocket premium affect a worker’s decision to participate in 
employer health insurance?” Unlike previous work, we are also able to examine workers’ 
enrollment in other offered benefits plans including dental insurance, vision care, long-
term care insurance, and wellness benefits. Previous work has found very small effects of 
premium on takeup of health insurance; however, these estimates could be biased toward 
zero due to a correlation between premium and unobservable demand for insurance or 
plan quality. We are able to solve this problem using unique data representing 
hypothetical choices of whether or not to participate in fringe benefits. The same 
employees made choices from the same (quality-constant) menu of alternatives under 
three different price regimes, providing price variation uncorrelated with either 
individual-specific or plan-specific unobservables which could affect the takeup decision. 
Results indicate that workers are very insensitive to price in the decision to take up health 
insurance. Workers show much greater price sensitivity to decisions about dental 
insurance, vision plans, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits. The very small 
price effect on the takeup of health insurance suggests that premium subsidies are 
unlikely to have a substantial impact on increasing insurance rates of workers already 
offered employer insurance. 
  
More than thirty-eight million Americans had no health insurance in 2000 according to 
the U.S. Census Bureau.  Concern over the number of the uninsured stems from many sources, 
ranging from negative health consequences of being uninsured, to the financial impact of lack of 
insurance, to the strain that uncompensated care due to lack of insurance puts on already 
burdened publicly-funded health facilities.  Despite a growing awareness of the problem over the 
preceding decade and attention to the matter by policymakers all the way up to the White House, 
the number of uninsured Americans increased substantially between 1987 and 2000 (U.S. 
Census Bureau). 
In the U.S. most private insurance is employment-based.  In 1996, 75% of workers were 
offered insurance through the workplace but 20% of those eligible for insurance from their 
employer did not take up that coverage (Cooper and Schone (1997)).  Of workers who were 
uninsured in recent years, approximately 60% worked at firms that did not offer insurance, 20% 
were not eligible for offered employer insurance, and 20% did not take up the health insurance 
offered by the employer (2000 data from Cutler (2002); 1999 data from Garrett et. al. (2001)).  
Efforts to increase the number of workers covered by employer-based insurance can therefore be 
directed in any or all of three ways:  policies to increase the number of employers offering 
insurance, policies to encourage liberalized eligibility at firms already offering insurance, or 
policies designed to increase the number of eligible workers who take up the coverage offered by 
their employers. 
We focus here on the decision to enroll in offered employer health insurance. Not only do 
a substantial number of workers offered employer insurance decline the coverage, that number 
has been increasing in recent years (Cooper and Schone (1997), Farber and Levy (2000), Cutler  
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(2002)).  The most common policy prescription for increasing takeup when insurance is offered 
is some type of premium subsidy.  (See, for example, Glied (2001).)  The question is whether or 
not this will work.  How much would premium subsidies increase participation in employer 
health plans that are already being offered?  And, more specifically, how large would such 
subsidies have to be to have a real impact on the number of workers who have no health 
insurance?   
The previous work most directly addressing these questions has found very small effects 
of premium on takeup.  These estimates imply that even subsidies as large as 50% would not 
induce most workers currently not enrolling in offered insurance to do so (Blumberg et. al. 
(2002), Cutler (2002), Chernew et. al. (1997)).  These studies are unable, however, to control 
completely for the correlation between premium and unobservable demand for insurance or plan 
quality that could cause bias in the estimates.   
We estimate the price sensitivity of workers’ takeup decisions using a unique dataset in 
which the variation in workers’ out-of-pocket premiums is exogenous, allowing us to estimate 
price effects unbiased by the correlation of premium and unobservable demand or unobservable 
plan quality.  The data represent hypothetical choices of whether or not to participate in fringe 
benefits such as employer-sponsored health insurance by employees at a single firm.  The data 
were collected in an effort to revise the firm’s benefits offerings to reflect more closely employee 
preferences.  The same employees made choices from the same (quality-constant) menu of 
alternatives under three different price regimes, providing price variation uncorrelated with 
either individual-specific or plan-specific unobservables which could affect the takeup decision.  
 We use these data to produce unbiased price elasticities.   
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With our data we are also able to estimate the effect of out-of-pocket prices on workers’ 
decisions to take up other offered employee benefits such as dental insurance, vision benefits, long-
term care insurance, and wellness benefits.  To our knowledge, our estimates are the first evidence on 
the price sensitivity of workers with respect to these other fringe benefits and, as such, should be of 
interest in understanding cafeteria-type benefit plans as well as fringe benefits  more generally.  
Elasticity estimates for other benefits also serve as a useful comparison to our estimates for health 
insurance. 
We find that workers are much more price sensitive to the out-of-pocket premium for fringe 
benefits other than health insurance than they are to health insurance.  In fact, the price elasticity of the 
takeup of health insurance is essentially zero in all of our models, providing support for previous work 
that has found very small effects.  However, workers are clearly sensitive to the price they pay for 
other fringe benefits.  Those negative and significant effects are quite robust to a variety of model 
specifications. 
 
PREVIOUS LITERATURE 
Of the previous literature, three studies are most closely related to this one:  Chernew et. al. 
(1997), Blumberg, et. al. (2002), and Cutler (2002).  Each of these studies examines the effect of 
premiums on the probability that workers eligible for employer health insurance will take up that 
coverage.
1   Chernew et. al. examine this question using a sample of low-income workers in small 
firms that offer health insurance, a subsample of  the Small Business Benefit Survey.  They restrict the 
                                                 
1Other studies provide premium elasticities of plan choice (Short and Taylor (1988), Feldman et. al. (1989), Royalty and 
Solomon (1999), Buchmueller and Feldstein (1999)).  These studies confirm the importance of the worker’s out-of-pocket 
premium in health insurance decisions but focus on the choice among health plans when more than one plan is offered.  They do 
not address the decision to take up employer coverage.  Abraham et. al. (2003) estimate a model of demand for insurance that 
models the choice between plans of different types, allows for an opt out decision, and takes into account the choices of 
households with more than worker.  The model is different than that estimated here but their opt out estimates imply higher (in 
absolute value) takeup elasticities than the studies focusing only on takeup.  
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sample to single workers with no other source of coverage.  The study finds a negative and significant 
effect of the employee’s out-of-pocket premium on the probability of taking up employer coverage; 
however, the effect is quite small.  Their results imply, for example, that direct premium subsidies to 
employees of 50% would increase takeup in this group only 3.2 points, from 89% to 92.2%.  This 
increase represents 29% of those eligible, but opting out of coverage at the unsubsidized rates. 
Blumberg et. al. (2002) tackle the same question using the 1996 Medical Expenditure Panel 
Survey.  Their approach is quite similar to that of Chernew et. al. but their data include a more 
nationally representative sample and many more individual-level variables that may help to explain the 
decision to participate in employer health insurance.  These data produce the same bottom line: it 
would take very large subsidies to have any real effect on takeup rates of employer-provided 
insurance.
2  Neither of these two studies can fully account for two possible sources of endogeneity that 
could bias the estimated price effects.  As both analyses point out, studies of this type are subject to the 
problem that workers are free to choose their jobs, thereby potentially inducing a correlation between 
the health plan premium they will face and unobservable components of their demand for insurance.  
Second, as is commonly recognized in the consumer demand literature, unobservable product quality 
that is correlated with price will produce price coefficient estimates that are biased toward zero in 
discrete choice models of product choice.  If workers are more likely to take up up higher quality 
health plans and if quality and price are positively correlated, then inadequate controls for plan quality 
will result in price effects that are biased downward in absolute value.  High-demand workers may also 
sort themselves into jobs with higher plan quality, inducing additional correlation between 
unobservable demand and price if price and quality are correlated.  For all of these reasons, the 
                                                 
2 In a study of Medicaid crowding out of private insurance using firm level data, Shore- Sheppard et al. (2000) estimate 
one model that also provides an elasticity of takeup with respect to employee premium.  Their estimate of -0.045 is very close to 
that found by the studies of Chernew et al. and Blumberg et. al.   
 
5
estimates of the previously cited studies could be biased and could explain why such small price 
effects are found in both studies. 
Cutler (2002 ) analyzes the effect of premiums on take up in the context of rising premiums and 
declining takeup over the period 1987 to 2000.  He addresses the problem of the endogeneity of the 
out-of-pocket premium by instrumenting using state tax rates.  His OLS estimates are of very similar 
magnitude to previous estimates and his IV elasticity estimates are larger in absolute value (-0.09) but 
still not large. There are also potential problems with this instrument.  State tax rates affect offer rates 
(Royalty (2000)) and as Cutler points out that could cause selection in the sample of firms that is 
correlated with the instrument.  Also, the use of state tax rates as an instrument for the out-of-pocket 
premium is based on the fact that traditionally the employer-paid portion of the premium was not taxed 
but the employee portion had to be paid with post-tax dollars.  With the advent of Section 125 plans, 
however, both the employee and the employer-paid portions of the premium can be paid with pre-tax 
dollars.  According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits Survey, 28% of private firms 
used Section125 plans in 1999.  There is, therefore, still a need to look for alternative ways to address 
the problem of the endogeneity of premium in these models of employee takeup.
3  
DATA 
The data were collected by International Planning and Research (IPR), a management 
consulting company for a project commissioned by the computer-maker NCR. In January and February 
of 2000, IPR surveyed 423 NCR employees at five sites.  This group of employees was chosen to be 
                                                 
3Several other studies address related questions but do not focus on employer-provided insurance.  Both Gruber and 
Poterba (1994) and Marquis and Long (1995) examine takeup in the nongroup market.  Using exogenous changes in the tax code 
to identify the effects, Gruber and Poterba find very large price elasticities for self-employed workers:  a 1% increase in premium 
price is associated with a 1.8% decrease in the probability of health insurance coverage for the self-employed.  The results of 
Marquis and Long are much more similar to those of Chernew et. al. and Blumberg et. al. once one accounts for the much smaller 
baseline takeup rate in the nongroup market.  It is difficult to know to what extent the findings from the nongroup market can be 
extrapolated to the employer setting, especially when potentially very different populations, such as the self-employed, are the 
study population for the non-group findings.    
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representative of NCR’s U.S. workforce.
4 
Surveyed employees identified what choices they would make if offered a given menu of 
benefits and options for each of those benefits.  While the choices were hypothetical, employees knew 
that this information was to be used to design changes to their true menu of benefits in order to align 
that menu of choices more closely to employee preferences.  They therefore had a greater incentive to 
answer honestly and thoughtfully than is often the case with hypothetical questions.  
NCR/IPR presented workers with a large set of possible benefits, including health insurance, 
dental insurance, vision care, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits along with a price or 
“change in cash pay” associated with each possible choice.  Surveys were computerized and were 
conducted in small group sessions of 8-12 employees.  Human resource managers were on hand to 
answer questions about the offered benefits packages but there was no consultation among the 
respondents.  The NCR human resources department also developed detailed online descriptive 
material to aid respondents in understanding each benefit category and the coverage provisions of each 
offered plan.  Based on this information, the employee indicated whether she would choose to 
participate in the particular benefit and, in some cases also the level of coverage.   
For example, for health coverage, an employee could choose to opt out of coverage, to cover 
employee only, employee plus one dependent, or employee plus two or more dependents.  If an 
employee chose to participate, several options were typically available.  In the case of health 
insurance, an employee could choose catastrophic coverage, an HMO, or a PPO.  The catastrophic 
coverage option and the PPO also allowed for a choice between brand-name or generic drug coverage. 
 The cost to the employee for each possible plan and coverage level was clear, with a display of the 
                                                 
4Employees were randomly chosen within age, gender, and income groups.  Approximately, 30% of employees invited 
to participate in the survey responded.  The resulting sample very closely approximated the distribution of these characteristics in 
the NCR workforce.  In the final report from IPR to NCR, weighting by actual demographic characteristics of the firm made no 
difference to the estimated effects or conclusions.  
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cumulative payroll deductions for the choices made constantly appearing in the upper right corner of 
the computer screen.  For this study, a worker is defined to have taken up the health insurance benefit 
if they participated in any of these plans at any coverage level. 
In the case of dental insurance, as with health insurance, a worker could choose to opt out 
health of benefits altogether, to cover only him- or herself, to cover self and one dependent, or to cover 
self and two or more dependents.  Dental plan options included a plan with no orthodontia coverage, a 
plan with $1500 orthodontia coverage, a plan with $2500 orthodontia coverage for children only, and a 
plan with $2500 orthodontia coverage for all covered persons.  We define takeup of dental benefits to 
be equal to one if the worker chose any of these plans at any coverage level.     
The vision care benefits offered were somewhat simpler.  The worker could choose among the 
following options: no vision care benefit, vision care discounts, two employee-only plans classified as 
“low” or “high” benefit, and two family plans also classified as “low” or “high” benefit.  A worker was 
defined as taking up vision benefits unless he or she opted out of the vision benefit altogether.  
We also analyze the decision to take up long-term care insurance.  NCR employees were 
offered the choice of no long-term care benefit, or long-term care benefits providing either $100, $200, 
or $300 daily benefit amounts.  The Wellness benefits offered included fitness center discounts, health 
information including Health Risk Assessments, $300 during open enrollment to use on wellness 
related areas (smoking cessation, weight loss, exercise equipment, fitness center memberships, etc.), 
and an on-site fitness center.  As before, participation in any level of long-term care or wellness 
benefits is defined as takeup of those benefits. 
Takeup rates for these employees were higher than the national average but still did not 
approach 100% (Table 1).  The takeup rate for the baseline prices was 93% for health insurance and 
87% for dental insurance.  Takeup was lower for the three other benefits, with the lowest takeup being 
for Wellness benefits at 41%.  Out-of-pocket premiums for health plans under the base case pricing  
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ranged from a low of $84/year for employee-only coverage under a catastrophic plan with generic drug 
coverage to a high of $1,530/year for a coverage of the employee plus two or more dependents for a 
PPO with brand name drug coverage.  Single dental coverage without orthodontia was $136/year while 
the most costly dental plan was family coverage with the highest level of orthodontia coverage costing 
$391/year.   The least expensive vision option was $30 while the most expensive was $195.  The cost 
of long-term care insurance was an increasing function of age.  For a 43-year-old worker, the cost of 
long-term care options ranged from $227-$680 annually.  Wellness benefits ranged in cost from $25-
$1000/year. 
The hypothetical exercise undertaken by the NCR employees closely resembles the procedure 
followed by employees offered cafeteria-style benefits plans when making their actual choices among 
benefits.
5  One key difference between this exercise and the actual choices made by workers during an 
open enrollment period, however, is that the NCR employees completed the exercise three times under 
three different price scenarios.  It is this fact that will allow us to identify the effect of price on the 
takeup decision, holding constant individual characteristics as well as plan quality.  Employees began 
by making their choices under a baseline price scheme.  They then went through the exercise a second 
and a third time, where, in one case, prices were 25% lower and in the other 25% higher than the base 
case scenario.
6    
In addition to the choice of benefits, NCR/IPR collected data from respondents on age, gender, 
race, income, years of tenure, job category, and location.  Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2. 
 
                                                 
5For additional information about the survey procedure, see Hagens et. al.  (2000).   
6As discussed above, the purpose of the proposed study is to analyze the takeup of offered employer health insurance.  
To answer this question, the survey design wherein the price of all health plans increased or decreased by the same percentage in 
the three different scenarios is an advantage since the price of all possible options and coverage levels rise by the same percentage 
relative to the opt out option.  This allows us to examine takeup without simultaneously modeling the worker’s choice among 
offered plans or levels of coverage.  
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ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE DATA 
Though the question to be answered is most similar to those of the studies cited above, the data 
to be used are more similar to analyses employing stated choice methods (Louviere et. al. (2000)).  In 
this approach, a researcher asks survey participants to make hypothetical choices or to rank 
hypothetical alternatives that vary along the dimensions under study, allowing the researcher to infer 
the relative importance of characteristics of the alternatives on the stated choice or stated preference 
ordering of the respondent.  There are a number of advantages to this approach as compared to the 
usual observed choice approach based on market data.  Louviere et. al. (2000) emphasize, for example, 
that observed alternatives frequently exhibit very little variation in certain characteristics, making it 
difficult or impossible to identify the effect of those characteristics on choices.  For instance, if 
virtually all health plans include maternity benefits then it will be impossible to infer from observed 
data a willingness to pay for maternity benefits.  A stated choice approach could overcome this 
problem.  The data used in this paper do exhibit substantial price variation: from 25% below baseline 
to 25% above baseline.  This is very useful in identifying a price effect.   
The key benefit of these data that we want to emphasize, however, is that the variation in the 
key explanatory variable – the out-of-pocket premium – is exogenous.  The study design holds 
constant plan quality while prices are varied, assuring that price effects are not biased by unobservable 
quality differences across plans.  The exogenous variation in prices also assures that out-of-pocket 
premiums are not correlated with individual characteristics as may be the case with the data on actual 
choices of workers since those workers may have sorted themselves into firms based on the health plan 
premium or quality available at that firm. The possible endogeneity of out-of-pocket premiums is the 
most troubling possible source of bias in previous studies.  We are able to circumvent that problem 
entirely with these data. 
The primary disadvantage of stated choice data is that it is difficult to know whether stated  
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choices accurately reflect actual the choices that would be made if the alternatives were not 
hypothetical.  As Louviere et. al. (2000) put it, “Economists typically display a healthy scepticism 
about relying on what consumers say they will do compared observing what they actually do” (p. 20).  
Yet the few studies that have compared revealed preference and stated choice data have found 
consistent results from models using the two types of data (Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990), Hensher 
and Bradley (1993)).  Additionally, as we argue above, the data used here, hypothetical choices of 
fringe benefits, including health insurance, by employees at a single firm, share many of the 
advantages of the data generally used in stated choice studies but with the added advantage that the 
respondents had an obvious incentive to answer thoughtfully and honestly.  
The other drawback of these data is that the sample is pulled from a single firm.  These workers 
are unlikely to be entirely representative of the U.S. population as a whole and, in particular, they may 
have a higher demand for insurance than the general population since they have chosen to work for a 
large firm that offers both several types of insurance and several plans of each type.  However, given 
that the results for health insurance takeup are similar to those found in nationally representative data 
mitigates this concern.  We also perform robustness checks on subsamples of the sample and include 
interactions with price effects in order to identify differences in price sensitivity across groups.  
NCR/IPR did not collect data on marital status, family composition, or access to other sources of 
health insurance, information that would be very useful for this analysis. We also attempt to deal with 
this issue in our robustness checks to the extent possible. 
 
ECONOMETRIC MODEL  
Following previous work, we will use binary probit models to estimate the effect of the 
worker’s out-of-pocket premium on the decision to accept or decline the health insurance offered by 
the employer.  We will use the same type of model to estimate the takeup of each offered benefit:  
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health insurance, dental insurance, vision benefits, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits.  
The dependent variable will indicate whether the worker enrolls in any level of the benefit at a given 
price.  The out-of-pocket price variable will measure the percentage increase or decrease relative to the 
base case pricing.
7   
It is here worth considering whether or not the out-of-pocket premium is the appropriate 
premium measure to use in order to capture the price sensitivity of workers with respect to their fringe 
benefits.  At NCR, as at many firms, the employer subsidizes many if not all fringe benefits.  The out-
of-pocket price paid by the workers is not equal to the full price of the benefit.  If workers believe that 
their individual wages are reduced by the amount of all subsidies paid on their behalf by the firm, then 
the total premium (employee share plus employer share) would be the appropriate premium measure.  
However, if wage offsets are not made on a worker-by-worker basis, even if the firm passes on the 
average cost of benefits to its workforce, workers will consider the out-of-pocket premium to be the 
relevant price in their decision-making.   
Previous work has found no evidence that employees internalize the full premium cost.  
Chernew et. al. show, in fact, that takeup of employer coverage increases with total premium, possibly 
reflecting unmeasured differences in quality across plans.  The positive or insignificant effect of total 
premium, coupled with the negative and significant effect of the worker’s portion of the premium 
suggests, as the authors point out, that workers are “acting as if wages are fixed and the employee 
contribution is the relevant price of participation.”  Blumberg et. al. confirm the results of Chernew et. 
al. on the relevance of out-of-pocket premium, rather than total premium, on the participation decision 
of workers.  Cutler, too, finds that the relevant price variable is the out-of-pocket premium; however, 
                                                 
7The out-of-pocket premium index is defined as follows: = 100 in the baseline price scenario; = 75 in the low price 
scenario when all prices were 25% lower than baseline; =125 in the high price scenario when all prices were 25% higher than 
baseline.  In order to make the small estimates easier to read, the models actually include OOP index % 10.  Therefore, the 
coefficient on the price variable (OOP index % 10) measures the effect on takeup of a 10% change in price.  
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he also includes total premium in some of his specifications in order to account for the increased value 
of insurance as healthcare costs rise.  Cutler finds a positive and significant effect of total premium on 
takeup. 
In addition to out-of-pocket premium, we also control for age, gender, race, income, years of 
tenure, and location.  We account for the error structure that results from having three observations on 
each individual by allowing the error term to be correlated across observations for the same individual. 
 From the probit model, we obtain estimates of the probability derivative with respect to each 
continuous explanatory variable.  For dummy variables, we report the difference in the probability 
evaluated at one and zero.  Of prime interest is the effect of premium on the probability of enrolling in 
coverage and the implied price elasticity.   
As discussed above, the advantage of these data as compared to that used in previous studies is 
that neither unobservable components of individual demand nor unobservable aspects of plan quality 
are correlated with the worker’s premium.  Any estimated association between price and takeup cannot 
be biased due to a sorting of, say, high-demand workers into firms with both higher quality and higher 
priced plans since there is no opportunity for workers to choose jobs based on either plan price or 
quality.  Plan quality is also constant across all three price regimes.  This is critical since we would 
expect that workers would be more likely to take up high-quality plans and also that high-quality plans 
are likely to have higher premiums.  Depending on the relationship between total premiums and out-
of-pocket premiums, the fact that in traditional survey data we are normally unable to observe all 
dimensions of quality is likely to produce an omitted variable bias in estimates of the effect of out-of-
pocket premium on takeup.  It is the endogeneity of premium that most plagues previous work.  The 
key advantage of these data is that premium is, by construction, exogenous. 
In addition to our health insurance takeup models, we also estimate probit models of the 
decision to take up dental  and vision coverage, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits.  The  
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existence of several benefit insurance choices gives us a chance to verify the experimental procedure 
by exploring, for example, whether workers are more price sensitive for these auxiliary benefits, as we 
expect.  These estimates also give us a useful point of comparison in understanding the magnitude of 
the estimated premium effects on health insurance and provide new evidence on price sensitivity in 
these other insurance markets. 
In addition to the basic model, we also estimate several other models in order to check the 
robustness of our results and to provide evidence on issues such as nonlinearity in price effects.  We 
illustrate that our results are robust to using a sample of workers not choosing family coverage and to a 
sample of workers with lower incomes.  We also examine whether the price sensitivity of the takeup 
decision varies by demographic characteristics such as income, gender, or race.  By interacting the 
premium variable with these demographic characteristics in our probit models, we will be able to test 
whether, for example, the participation decision of low-income workers is more sensitive to premiums 
than that of high-income workers. 
 
RESULTS 
Probability derivative estimates from the basic probit model for all five fringe benefits are 
reported in Table 3.  Before addressing the key results on premium effects, we briefly discuss the 
estimates of the effect of the control variables.  Very few of the personal characteristics included in the 
model are significant.  We find a negative and significant effect of salary on the probability of taking 
up both vision benefits and long-term care insurance, possibly due to decisions by higher income 
workers to self-insure in these dimensions.  Age negatively affects the probability of taking up health 
insurance and positively affects the probability of taking up the long-term care benefit.  The negative 
and significant effect of being male on the probability of taking up long-term care insurance may be 
explained by the fact that on average women live longer than men.  The negative effect of age on  
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health insurance takeup is more puzzling.  In unreported models, we found no particular pattern to this 
age effect and no interactions with age and other demographic characteristics.  The Nonwhite dummy 
is estimated to have a positive and significant effect on takeup of vision coverage and marginally 
significant positive effects on health and dental insurance takeup.  Last, tenure at the firm is 
significantly positively associated with the takeup of health insurance.   
The key results are reported in the first row and the last row of the table.  The first row reports 
the probability derivative of the out-of-pocket premium index % 10.  The reported probability 
derivatives are therefore the effect on takeup of a 10% change in the price to the worker.  The last row 
of the table reports the price elasticity implied by the estimated price effect. 
The out-of-pocket premium has essentially no effect on takeup of health insurance in this 
sample.  The estimate is statistically insignificant, implying a price elasticity of only -0.013.  As we 
see by looking at the results for the other benefits under study, this tiny price elasticity cannot be 
attributed to a more general insensitivity to the price of fringe benefits nor to the hypothetical nature of 
the exercise.  For all other benefits, we find a statistically and economically significant price effects.  
The estimated price elasticities are -0.167 for dental coverage, -0.276 for vision benefits, -0.468 for 
long-term care insurance, and -0.766 for wellness benefits.  The relative size of these price elasticities 
also accords with our expectations that workers might be more price sensitive for these other benefits 
than for health insurance and also that workers might be more sensitive to the price of wellness 
benefits and long-term care insurance than to the price of dental and vision benefits.  The results for 
these other benefits clearly show that the insensitivity to price in the health insurance takeup decision 
is not due to the nature of the exercise.  Workers were clearly able to understand the exercise and to 
change their choices in response to changes in prices.  Price simply had very little effect on their health 
insurance takeup decision.    
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These estimates are estimates of the elasticity of takeup, not the elasticity of coverage since it is 
probable that some of the workers in the sample who opt out of coverage at their own firm have 
coverage through a working spouse.  In this respect, the estimates are comparable to those of Cutler 
(2002).  However, Chernew et. al. (1997) explicitly choose to look only at single workers so as to 
avoid the issues raised by some workers having other coverage options.  Therefore, in their case, the 
elasticity of takeup is equal to the elasticity of coverage.
8   The NCR data do not include information 
on marital status so it is not possible to estimate the model for single workers only.  However, we 
would expect workers with other possible sources of coverage to be more price sensitive than workers 
with no other source of coverage.
9  Therefore the inability to control for the presence of a spouse or a 
spouse’s insurance offer cannot explain the zero price elasticity for health insurance that we find.  As a 
check and in order to produce estimates more comparable to those of Chernew et. al., we estimate the 
model on a sample of workers who do not choose any level of family coverage at any price for any of 
the benefits that specify coverage levels.  These results are presented in Table 4.  Although this is 
certainly an imperfect way of distinguishing single from married workers, the results are similar 
enough to those from the basic model to alleviate concerns that our results suffer severely from not 
being able to control for marital status.  The insignificance of premium on health plan takeup as well as 
the signficance of the out-of-pocket premium on the takeup of all other benefits remains.  The pattern 
with respect to the magnitudes of the elasticities across the benefits is also maintained.  
                                                 
8Blumberg et. al. are also able to divide their sample into groups of single and married workers.   
9This intuition is confirmed by recent empirical work of Abraham et. al. (2003).  
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Many policy prescriptions for increasing takeup focus on low-income workers.  This sample is 
not ideal for addressing that issue since the median income in the sample is substantially above the 
national median.  But we can explore this issue in two ways.  First, we estimated the model for each 
benefit including an interaction of income and premium in order to see whether there are differences in 
price elasticity by income level.
10  The interaction was insignificant in all cases except for vision 
insurance.  For vision insurance, we found that higher income workers were less price sensitive.  In the 
case of health insurance, the income interaction was insignificant and the uninteracted price effect 
remained insignificant as in the base model.  Second, we limited the sample to workers earning less 
than or equal to $34,000/year.  The results from this sample are presented in Table 5.  The pattern of 
results again does not change.  The magnitudes of the elasticities vary from the base model somewhat 
but the elasticity of health insurance takeup remains essentially zero. 
We also estimated models with price interactions with age, gender, and race.  Of the 15 
possible interactions (five benefits x three interactions), only three were statistically significant at the 
10% level.  We found that men were less price sensitive in the takeup of vision benefits and that older 
workers and nonwhite workers were less price sensitive to the takeup of wellness benefits.  Our overall 
conclusion is that price sensitivity for benefits differs little in these dimensions. 
Last, we estimate models that allow for a nonlinear price effect.  This specification addresses 
two main concerns.  The first is simply that price responses may not be equal at all levels of the out-of-
pocket premium.  The second is that we might be finding no price effect on health insurance because 
takeup rates at the baseline prices is quite high– 93%.  By estimating the model using dummy variables 
for the high price (125% of baseline) and the low price (75% of baseline), we can address both of these 
                                                 
10Including an interaction might also help account for differential tax effects for persons with different marginal tax 
rates.  Taxes affect workers differently because the out-of-pocket premium is paid with pre-tax dollars, providing a larger tax 
effect for employees in higher tax brackets.  However, this should not be a problem even in the basic model as we have specified 
it, since prices are expressed as a percentage of the baseline price.    
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concerns.  We can test whether the effect of a 25% higher price is equal to the negative of the effect of 
a 25% lower price.  Also, if the small price effect on health insurance is due to high baseline takeup, 
then we might not see much positive effect of price decrease but we would still expect to see a 
negative effect of a price increase.  These results are presented in Table 6. 
As we see in column 1 of Table 6, this specification continues to produce an insignificant price 
effect on health insurance.  The last two rows present two formal tests.  The second to last row presents 
the test statistic for testing the joint significance of the two price dummy variables.  The last row 
presents a test of the hypothesis that the effect of a 25% higher price is equal to the negative of the 
effect of a 25% lower price.  We cannot reject that the two price dummy variables are jointly equal to 
zero for health insurance.  The two price variables are jointly significant for all other fringe benefits.  
Both the low price dummy and the high price dummy are also individually insignificant.  Thus, it does 
not appear that the lack of price sensitivity in the health insurance takeup decision is simply due to 
high baseline takeup rates. 
For all benefits other than health insurance, the negative effect of a price increase is larger in 
absolute value than the positive effect of the same percentage price decrease.  Although the formal test 
for equality of the two effects rejects equality only in the case of the vision benefit, the strong pattern 
in the point estimates is suggestive of some nonlinearity in the premium effects.  In the case of these 
benefits, we think that these results are probably due to true nonlinearities in the sensitivity to premium 
and not simply a statistical artifact since baseline takeup rates for the other benefits are not nearly so 
high as is the case for health insurance.   
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CONCLUSION 
Our findings from these unique data complement and confirm previous studies.  We find, as 
has previous work, very low elasticities of takeup of health insurance with respect to the out-of-pocket 
premium.  Other analyses have suffered, however, from a possible bias due to price endogeneity that 
could cause workers to appear less price sensitive than they really are.  We use data with exogenous 
price variation – prices are uncorrelated with worker demand and plan quality by construction –  and 
also produce very low premium elasticities.  We conclude that previous results are not merely a result 
of biases induced by price endogeneity but that employees who are already offered health insurance 
are, in fact, very insensitive to price in the takeup decision.  We conclude that efforts to reduce the 
number of the uninsured via the employer-based system of health insurance will have to approach the 
problem very broadly and creatively since it appears that a simple focus on health insurance subsidies 
will not provide the hoped for silver bullet.  Subsidies in the range under consideration are unlikely to 
increase substantially the number of workers that voluntarily take up already offered employer 
coverage. 
Employers and policymakers should not, however, assume that the price insensitivity of 
workers in health insurance takeup should be extrapolated to takeup decisions of other fringe benefits. 
 We find evidence that workers are much more price sensitive in decisions to enroll in dental 
insurance, vision coverage, long-term care insurance, and wellness benefits.   
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Table 1 
Takeup Under Baseline Price Scenario 
 
Health 
Insurance  
 
Dental 
Insurance  
 
Vision 
Benefit 
 
Long-Term 
Care Benefit 
 
Wellness 
Benefit 
 
0.93  
 
0.87 
 
0.75 
 
0.47 
 
0.41 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Means 
(Standard Deviation) 
 
Age 
 
43.17 
(9.78)
 
Male Dummy 
 
 
0.58 
(0.49)
 
Nonwhite Dummy 
 
0.15 
(0.36)
 
Salary 
 
67,014.18 
(26,519.88)
 
Years of Tenure 
 
15.14 
(10.51)
 
OOP Premium Index 
 
100.00 
(20.42)
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Table 3 
Basic Probit Model
a 
Probability Derivatives
b 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
c 
 
 
 
  
 
Take Up 
Health 
Insurance
 
Take Up 
Dental 
Insurance
 
Take Up 
Vision 
Benefit
 
Take Up 
Long-Term 
Care Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Wellness 
Benefit
 
Out-of-Pocket 
Premium Index % 10 
d 
 
-0.0012 
(0.0009)
 
-0.0145 
(0.0025)
 
-0.0207 
(0.0032)
 
-0.0220 
(0.0037) 
 
-0.0314 
(0.0040)
 
Age 
 
-0.0030 
(0.0013)
 
0.0006 
(0.0021)
 
0.0040 
(0.0027)
 
0.0114 
(0.0034) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0030)
 
Salary in 1000's 
 
0.0002 
(0.0004)
 
-0.0003 
(0.0006)
 
-0.0019 
(0.0008)
 
-0.0028 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0009)
 
Tenure at Firm 
 
0.0028 
(0.0015)
 
0.0001 
(0.0021)
 
-0.0041 
(0.0026)
 
0.0028 
(0.0030) 
 
-0.0045 
(0.0029)
 
Male Dummy 
 
0.0354 
(0.0297)
 
-0.0015 
(0.0352)
 
-0.0378 
(0.0472)
 
-0.1333 
(0.0550) 
 
0.0051 
(0.0515)
 
Nonwhite Dummy 
 
0.0384 
(0.0202)
 
0.0623 
(0.0343)
 
0.1034 
(0.0502)
 
0.0763 
(0.0623) 
 
0.0733 
(0.0634)
 
Observations  
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
Implied Price Elasticity 
 
-0.013
 
-0.167
 
-0.276
 
-0.468 
 
-0.766
 
a Model also includes dummy variables for location of employee’s work site. 
 
b Derivatives of the probabilities for continuous variables.  Differences in the predicted probabilities evaluated at one and 
zero for each dummy variable.  Other variables evaluated at means. 
c Standard errors allow for correlation in the unobservables across observations for the same individual. 
dThe out-of-pocket premium index is defined as follows: = 100 in the baseline price scenario; = 75 in the low price 
scenario when all prices were 25% lower than baseline; =125 in the high price scenario when all prices were 25% higher 
than baseline.  Therefore, the coefficient on OOP index % 10 measures the effect on takeup of a 10% change in price. 
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Table 4 
Basic Probit Model on Workers Never Choosing Family Coverage
a 
Probability Derivatives
b 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
c 
 
 
 
Take Up 
Health 
Insurance 
 
Take Up 
Dental 
Insurance 
 
Take Up 
Vision 
Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Long-Term 
Care Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Wellness 
Benefit 
 
Out-of-Pocket 
Premium Index % 10 
d 
 
-0.0017 
(0.0032)
 
-0.0156 
(0.0053)
 
-0.0167 
(0.0056)
 
-0.0177 
(0.0078) 
 
-0.0422 
(0.0103)
 
Age 
 
-0.0059 
(0.0033)
 
-0.0074 
(0.0048)
 
-0.0017 
(0.0054)
 
0.0037 
(0.0063) 
 
-0.0128 
(0.0052)
 
Salary in 1000's 
 
-0.0009 
(0.0017)
 
-0.0014 
(0.0022)
 
-0.0033 
(0.0025)
 
-0.0076 
(0.0029) 
 
0.0017 
(0.0024)
 
Tenure at Firm 
 
0.0025 
(0.0043)
 
0.0027 
(0.0057)
 
-0.0019 
(0.0068)
 
0.0218 
(0.0071) 
 
0.0043 
(0.0062)
 
Male Dummy 
 
-0.1338 
(0.0757)
 
-0.1632 
(0.0954)
 
-0.2570 
(0.1105)
 
-0.2035 
(0.1081) 
 
0.0402 
(0.1058)
 
Nonwhite Dummy 
 
0.0723 
(0.0606)
 
0.1027 
(0.0862)
 
0.1847 
(0.0885)
 
0.0443 
(0.1208) 
 
-0.2227 
(0.1005)
 
Observations 
 
333 
 
333 
 
333 
 
333 
 
333 
 
Implied Price Elasticity 
 
-0.020 
 
-0.203 
 
-0.235 
 
-0.377 
 
-0.898 
 
a Model also includes dummy variables for location of employee’s work site. 
 
b Derivatives of the probabilities for continuous variables.  Differences in the predicted probabilities evaluated at one and 
zero for each dummy variable.  Other variables evaluated at means. 
c Standard errors allow for correlation in the unobservables across observations for the same individual. 
dThe out-of-pocket premium index is defined as follows: = 100 in the baseline price scenario; = 75 in the low price 
scenario when all prices were 25% lower than baseline; =125 in the high price scenario when all prices were 25% higher 
than baseline.  Therefore, the coefficient on OOP index % 10 measures the effect on takeup of a 10% change in price. 
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Table 5 
Basic Probit Model on Workers Earning ≤$34,000/year 
Probability Derivatives
a 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
b 
 
 
 
Take Up 
Health 
Insurance 
 
Take Up 
Dental 
Insurance 
 
Take Up 
Vision 
Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Long-Term 
Care Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Wellness 
Benefit 
 
Out-of-Pocket 
Premium Index % 10
c 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0224 
(0.0105) 
 
-0.0314 
(0.0128) 
 
-0.0322 
(0.0168) 
 
-0.0304 
(0.0177) 
 
Age 
 
-0.0009 
(0.0016) 
 
0.0010 
(0.0060) 
 
-0.0068 
(0.0051) 
 
0.0101 
(0.0106) 
 
-0.0159 
(0.0093) 
 
Salary in 1000's 
 
0.0013 
(0.0022) 
 
0.0095 
(0.0154) 
 
0.0193 
(0.0110) 
 
0.0066 
(0.0226) 
 
-0.0044 
(0.0216) 
 
Tenure at Firm 
 
-0.0001 
(0.0002) 
 
-0.0099 
(0.0092) 
 
-0.0072 
(0.0056) 
 
0.0115 
(0.0127) 
 
0.0118 
(0.0125) 
 
Male Dummy 
 
-0.0632 
(0.0747) 
 
-0.0499 
(0.1678) 
 
-0.0301 
(0.1358) 
 
-0.2365 
(0.2155) 
 
0.2672 
(0.1643) 
 
Nonwhite Dummy 
 
-0.2019 
(0.1612) 
 
-0.0942 
(0.1824) 
 
-0.2242 
(0.1866) 
 
0.2372 
(0.1738) 
 
0.1662 
(0.1927) 
 
Observations 
 
108 
 
108 
 
108 
 
108 
 
108 
 
Implied Price Elasticity 
 
-0.005 
 
-0.277 
 
-0.374 
 
-0.575 
 
-0.596 
 
a Derivatives of the probabilities for continuous variables.  Differences in the predicted probabilities evaluated at one and 
zero for each dummy variable.  Other variables evaluated at means. 
b Standard errors allow for correlation in the unobservables across observations for the same individual. 
cThe out-of-pocket premium index is defined as follows: = 100 in the baseline price scenario; = 75 in the low price 
scenario when all prices were 25% lower than baseline; =125 in the high price scenario when all prices were 25% higher 
than baseline.  Therefore, the coefficient on OOP index % 10 measures the effect on takeup of a 10% change in price. 
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Table 6 
Probit Model with Nonlinear Price Effect
a 
Probability Derivatives
b 
Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses
c 
 
 
 
Take Up 
Health 
Insurance 
 
Take Up 
Dental 
Insurance 
 
Take Up 
Vision 
Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Long-Term 
Care Benefit 
 
Take Up 
Wellness 
Benefit 
 
Dummy for Price=75% 
of Baseline Price 
 
0.0056 
(0.0063)
 
0.0282 
(0.0094)
 
0.0244 
(0.0130)
 
0.0370 
(0.0172) 
 
0.0574 
(0.0168)
 
Dummy for 
Price=125% of Baseline 
Price 
 
-0.0005 
(0.0043)
 
-0.0447 
(0.0104)
 
-0.0796 
(0.0158)
 
-0.0729 
(0.0174) 
 
-0.0989 
(0.0190)
 
Age 
 
-0.0030 
(0.0013)
 
0.0006 
(0.0021)
 
0.0040 
(0.0027)
 
0.0114 
(0.0034) 
 
0.0004 
(0.0030)
 
Salary in 1000's 
 
0.0002 
(0.0004)
 
-0.0003 
(0.0006)
 
-0.0019 
(0.0008)
 
-0.0028 
(0.0010) 
 
-0.0010 
(0.0009)
 
Tenure at Firm 
 
0.0028 
(0.0015)
 
0.0001 
(0.0021)
 
-0.0041 
(0.0026)
 
0.0028 
(0.0030) 
 
-0.0045 
(0.0029)
 
Male Dummy 
 
0.0354 
(0.0297)
 
-0.0015 
(0.0352)
 
-0.0380 
(0.0472)
 
-0.1333 
(0.0550) 
 
0.0052 
(0.0515)
 
Nonwhite Dummy 
 
0.0384 
(0.0202)
 
0.0623 
(0.0343)
 
0.1033 
(0.0502)
 
0.0762 
(0.0622) 
 
0.0734 
(0.0634)
 
Observations  
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
1263 
 
Test for Low Price and 
    High Price Jointly      
 Equal to Zero 
Chi-squared Statistic 
(p-value) 
 
 
 
1.77 
(0.412)
 
 
 
35.92 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
44.31 
(0.000)
 
 
 
36.93 
(0.000) 
 
 
 
60.61 
(0.000)
 
Test for Low Price =  
     – High Price 
Chi-squared Statistic 
(p-value) 
 
 
0.25 
(0.614)
 
 
0.79 
(0.374)
 
 
5.02 
(0.025)
 
 
1.43 
(0.233) 
 
 
2.04 
(0.153)
 
a Model also includes dummy variables for location of employee’s work site. 
 
b Derivatives of the probabilities for continuous variables.  Differences in the predicted probabilities evaluated at one and 
zero for each dummy variable.  Other variables evaluated at means. 
c Standard errors allow for correlation in the unobservables across observations for the same idividual.  
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